me John Morrow

CV

Research

Teaching

 

Course Papers

(In Progress)

   
    Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market  (Interactive Example w/Chicago Data)  
 

(with Yoav Sivan)

Abstract. There have been few attempts to empirically explain the pursuit of short term relationships and sex in a formal context. Previous work has lamented the paucity of empirical studies which utilize incentive driven behavior to draw conclusions and recommend policy. We provide an empirical approach derived from a game theoretic model of social interaction and apply it to a population of high interest. Specifically, we apply the approach to a population of sexually active men who have sex with men (MSM) in a large metropolitan area and derive qualitative conclusions regarding how individuals behave in the marketplace for sex.

 
  Citation:  (Bibtex)  
       
    Purchase Timing of Durable Goods in Dynamic Settings  
 

Abstract. Recent empirical work has investigated consumer purchasing decisions taking into account dynamic properties of the market, for instance rising product quality levels, e.g. (Melnikov, 2000). Taking such models seriously, we model evolving product quality levels over time and use the estimates to estimate purchase timing decisions of consumers. This results in demand estimates that tie levels and expectations of market conditions to current purchasing decisions through optimal purchase timing. We apply the estimation procedure to the new car market in four OECD countries over a thirty year period. Considering cars as durable goods which are financed at prevailing interest rates and whose value is affected by road infrastructure, we explain aggregate purchase decisions through dynamic changes in interest rates and infrastructure. In addition our estimates match stylized facts regarding the auto market, in particular qualitative data regarding car brands and cyclical patterns in demand.

 
    Citation:  (Bibtex)  
       
    Endowments, Equality and Power Relationships   
 

Abstract. In a class of games where resources are allocated between joint production and a power technology we examine how power relationships form due to differences in endowments despite equal access to production and power technologies. The class of games is simple, broad and includes such canonical examples as multiple firm Cournot competition with capacity constraints. Differences in power are evidenced both in outcomes and qualitatively different strategies, and characterizations of model characteristics are obtained in terms of the elasticities of the joint production and power technologies. As an application, we investigate the role of institutional rules on power and implications for the exhibition of servility towards powerful agents.

 
    Citation:  (Bibtex)